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Agenda 
• Agenda 
- What happened? 
- Why did this happen? 
- Discussion on Two-Blocking 
- NASA requirements for two upper limit switches 
- Limit switch set up and testing 
- Lessons learned, how each of us could have 
prevented this accident. 
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• 
What Happened? 
• KSC Orbiter Processing Facility, Orbiter Payload 
Bay Bucket Hoist Mishap 
- March 8, 1985, during final closeout of the orbiter 
Discovery, a payload bay access platform fell from its 
stowed position. 
- This resulted in damage to the Discovery's insulating 
blankets and forward payload bay door. 
- A Lockheed Technician suffered a broken leg. 
- This delayed launch by approximately three weeks. 
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· . 
ORBITER PROCESSING FACILITY ACCESS PLATFORMS 
I . 
DETAIL OF PAYLOAD BAY AREA 
ACCESS BRIDGE 
/ 
Figure 9-3-1. Sketch of opr Access Platforms on bridge crane, upper vi ew 
• 
OPF Payload Bucket Hoist 
• 
OPF Payload Bucket Hoist 
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Fiaure 9-B-2. Side view of Access Platform hoist, cable system, and telescoping tubes 
• 
Why did this Happen? 
• 'While placing the platform in the full up position ' 
to stow the bucket hoist the operators were 
using the upper limit switch as a control stop 
(only one control type upper limit switch). 
• The location of the limit switch set point and the 
mechanical configuration of telescoping tube 
assemblies was so close that there was little 
room for drift between the limit switch actuation 
point / hoist stop point and mechanical contact 
between the telescoping tube assemblies and 
hard structure. All 8 Payload Bucket Hoists 
were adjusted the same way. 
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• 
Why did this Happen? 
• In effect they were running the' risk of two-
blocking the hoist every time they used the 
upper limit switch to stow the bucket hoist in the 
full up position. 
• Two blocking is about the worse thing you can 
do to a hoist. You only need to two block a hoist 
once to cause a failure and drop the load. 
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• 
Two-Blocking 
• Two-Blocking · 
- Two-blocking is the result of hoisting beyond the 
intended safe upper limit of hook travel to the point of 
solid contact between the load block and the upper 
block or hoist/trolley structure. The usual result is 
immediate failure of the wire rope, due to the ropes 
being cut by the grooves of the drum or sheaves. 
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• 
Two-Blocking 
• Play the Two Block film clip." 
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• 
Two-Blocking 
• Two Blocking (continued) 
- The electric motor can produce high torque in a 
fraction of a second. 
• A DC motor can produce 180% of rated motor torque. 
• An AC motor can produce 275% of rated motor torque. 
• we are assuming the hoist motor is not oversized. 
- During the two block event two things happen at the 
instant the upper and lower block impact. 
• First the motor torque increases abruptly, secondly the 
rotational inertia of the hoist motor adds to the motor torque. 
- If the wire rope does not fail something else will. " 
Perhaps damage will be hidden (in a coupling or gear 
reducer). 
• Commercial hoist machinery is not designed to withstand the 
loads created during two blocking. 
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• 
Two-Blocking 
Gear Box Depicting the Spider Plate and Relative Position of 
the Spider in the Gear Box 
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• 
Two-Blocking 
Cracks Around the Shaft and Bearing 
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• 
Two-Blocking 
Spider Plate Removed From the Gear Box 
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• 
Two Blocking 
Drum Shaft Spline Depicting the Deformation Found 
After the Spider Failure 
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• 
RING Contributing Factors 
• . The bucket hoist has two fully redundant attach 
points to the telescoping tubes and a length of 
wire rope (that would act like a spring between 
the attach point and the wire rope drum). 
• This redundant design appears to provide 
unparalleled strength and safety, i.e. two 
separate load paths. 
• However, two blocking is so severe the 
redundant load paths and the high design 
margins does not provide protection against the 
loads imposed from two blocking! 
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Fiaure 9-B-2. Side view of Access Platform hoist, cable system, and telescoping tubes 
• 
Contributing Factors 
• The operators were "just barely" two blocking 
the hoist every time they stowed the bucket. 
- Before the accident ... inspection of the 1 0 inch 
telescoping tubes revealed evidence of metal to metal 
contact on the supporting structure. Apparently no 
action was taken by the inspectors. 
- Before the accident ... The actuator arm on the hoist 
limit switch broke. The Bucket Hoist was Locked Out 
/ Tagged Out until repairs could be made. 
- The operators were confused about the type of Lock 
Out / Tag Out imposed on the equipment and they 
operated the unit anyway. 
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• 
Contributing Factors 
- Before the accident. ~. The Training / Certification 
course "OPF / High Bay Bridge Bucket Operator 
Certification" taught all operators to use the upper 
limit switch as an operating control during stow 
operations. Approximately 200 people were certified 
to operate these units. 
- After the accident ... all buckets hoist were inspected, 
of the 8 bucket hoists 7 showed signs of damage as 
demonstrated by elongated or cracked master links 
(the accident was going to happen, it could have 
happened on any payload bucket it was just a matter 
of time ... ) 
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• 
NASA Safety Standards 
• The NASA Safety Standard NASA-STO-8719.9 
requires two upper limit switches. This is to 
prevent two blocking. 
• The switches should be electrically independent 
such that a common electrical failure cannot 
render both switches inoperable. 
- Usually the first switch is a "control" limit switch 
arranged to stop hoisting but allow lowering. 
- The second limit switch is a "power" limit switch 
arranged to remove power from the hoist. This switch 
will stop all hoist motion (sometimes shut down the 
crane). This is our last chance to prevent Two Block! 
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Fig. 142 
Fig. 141 
• 
Limit Switch Set-up and Testing 
• The failure of one switch is always backed up by 
the second switch. This is a fundamental design 
philosophy. 
• Also the power upper limit switch usually a 
weight operated switch is very simple in design 
and should always work (but they have been 
known to fail). 
• The actuation or set point of the limit switch is 
very important. 
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• 
Limit Switch Set-up and Testing 
.• Note in the figure ... Each limit switch needs 
adequate space between their set points 
- They must have a distance to trip the switch 
- They must have adequate distance to allow for drift 
- And finally they must have adequate clearance 
between the each switch. 
• Adequate space is necessary between the two 
switches and between the final switch and two 
blocking. 
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• 
Limit Switch Set-up and Testing 
• The two switches complement each other. They 
provide an additional layer of protection ... in the 
event one switch fails. 
• The switches are of different types and they 
perform a different function. If the geared limit 
switch fails you know something is wrong. 
- If you approach the control limit switch and the crane 
shuts down you know the control switch has failed. 
- Also the control switch should be tested at the start of 
each operation to assure it's functioning properly. 
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• 
Limit Switch Set-up and Testing 
- If the geared limit switch does not work during "start 
of operation testing" (and you move into the power 
limit switch), the power limit switch will shut down the 
crane and you are stuck! You cannot move until the 
power limit switch is reset. This is telling you 
something ... you almost two-blocked! This is how 
you know something is wrong and it forces the 
operator to notify engineering. The geared limit is not 
working correctly and needs immediate attention 
(your operation must stop until this switch is fixed)! 
• The power switch should be tested periodically 
to assure it's functioning. It's simple design 
assures its operation (at least most of the time). 
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• 
Limit Switch Set-up and Testing 
• You should never use a limit switch as an 
operational control. 
• The safety standards are very explicit about the 
upper limit switch design, setup and testing 
requirements. These requirements are there for 
good reason. Two blocking is the most 
devastating and unforgiving accident that can 
occur on a hoist. That is what these limit 
switches are for, its up to us to assure they are 
in place and functioning correctly. 
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• 
Lessons Learned 
• How many things went wrong? 
• Poor design, 
- We had one limit switch. 
- Not enough headroom to allow for clearance between 
the limit switch trip point and two blocking. 
- Poor system testing, proper limit switch set up and 
adjustment simply not done. 
- Reliability Engineering did not identify the violation of 
the NASA Safety Standard. 
- Poor operator training, 200 operators trained to use 
the upper limit as an operating control. 
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• 
Lessons Learned 
• Crane inspectors noticed evidence of metal to metal 
contact of telescoping tubes with supporting structure 
(did they understand how dangerous this is?). 
• Poor operational controls, there was confusion about the 
meaning of the lock out / tag out (the unit was operated 
anyway). 
Did I forget something? 
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• 
Lessons Learned 
• This accident coul'd have been prevented by a 
lot of people, engineers, techs, basically 
everyone involved with this equipment. 
- Design engineering 
- Reliability engineering 
- Crane training personnel 
- Crane inspectors 
- Crane operators 
• Everyone along the way made mistakes and an 
accident resulted. 
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• 
Swiss Cheese Model 
• I like to think that every person and every' aspect · 
of an operation forms part of a system made up 
of "Many Layers Protection" to assure successful 
and safe completion of a job. 
• The "Swiss Cheese Model" describes these 
layers of protection the best. There are many 
layers of protection. No one layer is perfect or 
full proof, this is depicted by the holes in the 
Swiss Cheese. 
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• . How many layers of protection can we think of? . 
- Training 
- Institutional support 
- Empowering the work force 
- Proper system design 
- Adherence to NASA and industry standards 
- Rigorous system testing 
- Proper system inspection and periodic testing 
• The crane savvy tech is the most important layer 
of protection we have! 
• No one layer of protection is perfect but together 
we can avoid accidents. 
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